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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
ROY FREE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.
SWEN C. JENSEN, CHRIS JENSEN
and ALMA JENSEN, his wife, REGIONAL AGRICULTURAL CREDIT
CORPORATION OF SALT LAKE
CITY, UTAH, a corporation,

Case No.
6326

Defendants and Appellants.

Appellants' Brief
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The decree appealed from was entered in an action
brought by the respondent to quiet title to a parcel of farming land located near Woods Cross in Davis County. The
complaint is in the usual form except that it alleged that
the defendants Chris Jensen and Alma Jensen were in
possession of the premises. Since the validity of a tax
title is one of the questions involved it becomes important
to keep in mind the exact description of the property set
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forth in the original complaint. That description is as
follows: (Tr. 1-3).
Beginning at the Northeast corner of Section
34, Townsip 2 North, Range 1 West, Salt Lake
Meridian; running thence South 22 5/7 rods; thence
West to Jordan River ; thence North along the East
bank to the North line of Section 33, East to beginning, containing 80 acres.
Also beginning 22 5/7 rods South from the
Northeast corner of Section 33 aforesaid; running
thence South 52lj3 rods; thence West to the Jordan
River; thence North along the East bank of the
river to a point 22 5/7 rods South from the North
line of Section 33 ; thence East to beginning, containing 183 acres.
After the trial had begun the plaintiff, over the objection of the appellants, was permitted to amend the
complaint by striking out the words "Section 33" in' the
second line of the second paragraph of the description
and inserting in lieu thereof the words "Section 34."
(Tr. 11). The defendants Jensen answered the complaint,
denying plaintiff's title, claiming equitable ownership in
themselves, and asserting that plaintiff's claim of title
was founded upon a deed from Davis County which conveyed no title because of irregularities in the tax sale
proceedings leading up to and including the auditor's deed.
They also alleged that the plaintiff purchased the property
from the county pursuant to a collusive arrangement be·
tween the plaintiff and the defendants Alice Farnworth
and D. A. Skeen, which in effect created in the plaintiff
a nominal title only, the real beneficiaries of the purchase
being the defendants Farnworth and Skeen. (Tr. 28). The
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defendant Regional Agricultural Credit Corporation of
Salt Lake City also answered the complaint, and after
putting in issue plaintiff's claim of title set up the lien
of the judgment recovered by it against the defendant
Alice Farnworth and her husband James Farnworth. This
defendant further alleged that the defendant Alice Farn~
worth was the equitable owner of the property, subject
to the lien of the judgment, and that whatever title the
plaintiff acquired from Davis County was held in trust by
him for the defendant Alice F'arnworth. (Tr. 25.)
The defendants Alice Farnworth and D. A. Skeen conveniently defaulted although the latter did set up a mort~
gage in his favor given to him by his co-defendant.
Upon the issues raised by the above mentioned pleadings the court awarded the property described in the
amended complaint to the plaintiff and quieted his title
against all adverse claims of the defendants. (Tr. 23.)
Upon the trial it was stipulated that the appellant Regional
Agricultural Credit Corporation of Salt Lake City, Utah
was awarded a judgment against the defendant Alice Farnworth and James Farnworth, her husband, in the amount
alleged in that defendant's answer; that the judgment was
docketed and filed in the office of the clerk of Davis
County on March 15, 1935 and that it remained wholly unsatisfied. (Tr. 22.) It was further stipulated that the lien
of this judgment was prior and superior to the mortgage
of the defendant Skeen. (Tr. 41.) Although this mortgage
was prior in time to the judgment, the defendant Skeen by
agreement expressly made his mortgage subsequent and
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inferior to the judgment in favor of the R. A. C. C. (Defs.
Ex. 4.)
As the basis of his claim of ownership to the property
described in the amended complaint the plaintiff introduced in evidence the auditor's deed to Davis County. This
deed covers the following described property.
Beginning at the Northeast corner of Section 34,
Township 2 North, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Meridian; running thence South 22 5/7 rods; thence
West to Jordan River; thence North along the East
bank to the North line of Section 33, East to beginning, containing 80 acres.
Also beginning 22 5/7 rods South from the
Northeast corner of above Section ; running thence
South 521j3 rods; thence West to the Jordan River;
thence North along the East bank of the river to a
point 22 5/7 rods South from the North line of Section 33; thence East to beginning, containing 183
acres.
Plaintiff then introduced in evidence a certificate of
sale issued by the treasurer of Davis County. This certificate covers the following described property. (Plfs. Ex. B.)
Beg NE cor of Sec 34, Twp 2 N, Rg 1 W, SLM;
S 22 5/7 rds; W to Jordan River; N along E bank
to N line of Sec 33, E to beg. cont 80 a. Also beg
22 5/7 rds S fr NE cor of above Sec ; S 521!3 rds;
W to Jordan River; N along E bank of river to a pt
22 5/7 rds S fr N line of Sec 33 ; E to beg. cont 183 A.
The notice of May sale recites that the County Commissioners will sell for cash on the 15th day of May, 1939, etc.,
pursuant to Section 80-10-68 of the Revised Statutes of
Utah, 1933, the following described property, assessed in
the following names, to wit: (Plfs. Ex. A.)
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"JAMES FARNSWORTH-Beginning at the Northeast corner of Section 34, Township 2 North,
Range 1 West, Salt Lake Meridian ; running
thence South 22 5/7 rods; thence West to Jordan River ; thence North along the East bank
to the North line of Section 33 ; thence East to
beginning, containing 80 acres.
"Also beginning 22 5/7 rods South from the Northeast corner of the above Section, running thence
South 52lf3 rods; thence West to Jordan River;
thence North along the East bank of the river
to a point 22 5/7 rods South from the North
line of Section 33 ; thence East to beginning,
containing 183 acres."
The deed under which plaintiff claims to have acquired
title from Davis County is executed and acknowledged by
the County Auditor. (Plfs. Ex. C.) It contains no preliminary recitals, although in the body of the deed it is
stated that the conveyance is made in consideration of the
payment by the grantee of the sum of $643.40, delinquent
taxes, penalties, interest and costs, constituting a charge
against the property, which was sold to the County for non~
payment of taxes for the year 1933 in the sum of $127.49.
It is also stated that the property was duly advertised and
sold to the highest bidder at a public auction on the 15th
day of May, 1939. The property is described substantially
as it is described in the amended complaint. On the 7th day
of December, 1933, James Farnworth conveyed to his wife,
the defendant Alice Farnworth, the following described
property:
Beginning at the Northeast corner of Section
Thirty-four (34), Township Two (2) North, Range
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One ( 1) West, Salt Lake Meridian, running thence
South 22 5/7th rods ; thence West to the Jordan
River; thence Northerly along the East Bank of the
Jordan River to the North line of Section Thirty.
three (33) Township and Range aforesaid; thence
East to the point of beginning. Containing 80 acres,
more or less.
Also beginning 22 5/7th rods South of the
Northeast corner of Section Thirty-three (33),
Township and Range aforesaid, thence South 52¥3
rods; thence West to the Jordan River; thence Northerly along the East Bank of the Jordan River, to a
point 22 5/7th rods South from the North line of
Section Thirty-three (33) aforesaid, thence East
to the point of beginning. Containing 183 acres,
more or less.
This deed was recorded April 2, 1934. Thereafter the
property described in the amended complaint was assessed
to the defendant Alice Farnworth notwithstanding the fact
that she held the title to the first parcel only consisting of
eighty acres. (Tr. 17.)
The facts which appellants claim demonstrate that the
plaintiff purchased the property pursuant to a collusive
plan to deprive the appellants of their interest in the
property may be thus summarized. Under date of November
4, 1935 the defendant Alice Farnworth and her deceased
husband entered into an exchange agreement with the appellants Chris Jensen and Alma Jensen whereby the Farnworths undertook to exchange the property in question for
property in Salt Lake. (See defendants' Exhibit 3). The
Farnworths agreed to pay the taxes for the years 1933 and
1934 which were then in default. As previously stated, the
appellant R. A. C. C. had recovered a judgment against

Th:~ a
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the defendant Alice Farnworth in the sum in excess of
$1500.00 which was a lien upon the property when the
exchange agreement was entered into. In this situation
Mrs. Farnworth appealed to the plaintiff, who was a friend
of the family, for assistance to prevent the loss of her
interests in the property. (Tr. 29.) At first the plaintiff
refused any aid but upon being repeatedly importuned finally consented to help her. She prevailed upon him to go to
the office of her attorney, D. A. Skeen, who was also a
friend of the plaintiff, and as above stated, held a mortgage on the property. (Tr. 29.) It was there decided that
plaintiff should bid in this property at the tax sale. Skeen
assured plaintiff that he, Skeen, would take the property
off the plaintiff's hands. (Tr. 32.) Plaintiff repeatedly
stated that he purchased the property to protect the interests of Mrs. Farnworth and Skeen and that Skeen assured him that when he, Skeen, took over the property Mrs.
Farnworth's interests would be protected. (Tr. 36.) It
was decided that immediately after bidding in the property
an action would be brought in the plaintiff's name to quiet
the title. Skeen accompanied the plaintiff to Farmington
to bid in the property. (Tr. 28.) He examined the proceedings leading up to the sale and told the plaintiff that they
were regular. (Tr. 28.) Immediately after bidding in the
property the plaintiff ahd Skeen entered into a written
agreement in which the plaintiff agreed to transfer the
property to Skeen for the amount which plaintiff bid for
it plus interest and his expenses (See Plaintiff's Exhibit D).
This agreement recites that Skeen was not in a position to
bid in the property hi'mself and that it might be necessary
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to quiet the title which Skeen undertook to do without charge.
The complaint in the present action was prepared by Skeen.
(Tr. 27.) Plaintiff knew of the judgment in favor of the
R. A. C. C. (Tr. 37) and also knew of the exchange agre~
ment with Jensens and that they were living on the property
(Tr. 39.) Plaintiff admitted that he did not want the
property (Tr. 39) and that he never examined the property
although he did visit it at one time.
STATEMENT OF ERRORS
The appellants assert that the findings of fact which
are numbered 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16 and 19 are not supported by any evidence and are contrary to the undisputed
evidence, and that the conclusions and judgment of the
court are contrary to the evidence and the law. More particularly stated, the errors relied upon are that the evidence
discloses that the plaintiff acquired no title from Davis
County because the deed under which he claims was not
executed by any lawfully authorized officer; that the certificate of sale and assessment of the property are void
because the property is not described with sufficient certainty and definiteness; that the plaintiff offered no evidence to prove that the tax sale under which he claims was
lawfully conducted or properly made; that the property was
sold at the tax sale for a sum largely in excess of the amount
of any taxes lawfully assessed, thereby rendering the sale
void. Appellants further assert that the, court erred in
rendering a judgment in favor of the plaintiff for the
reason that the evidence disclosed that the plaintiff purchased the property at the tax sale pursuant to a collusive
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and fraudulent arrangement entered into with the defendant
Alice Farnworth and defendant D. A. Skeen for the purpose of depriving appellants of their rights in the property.
Appellants also urge that the court erred in allowing the
plaintiff to amend his complaint to describe an entirely
different piece of property from that mentioned in the
original complaint.

,.

~;

;;
::

ii

r:

:1

:i

I. THE DESCRIPTION OF THE PROPERTY IN A
CERTIFICATE OF SALE MUST BE DEFINITE AND
CERTAIN AND RESORT TO EXTRANEOUS FACTS IS
NOT PERMISSIBLE TO RESOLVE AMBIGUITIES.
Buckner v. Sugg, 96 S. W. 184.
Cooper v. Lee, 27 S. W. 970.
Burton v. Hoover, 74 P. (2) 652, 93 Utah 498.
Allen v. Fitzgerald, 23 Utah 597, 65 P. 592.
Tintic Undine Mining Co. v. Ercanbrack, 93 Utah
561, 74 P. (2) 1184.
The description of the property as it appears in the
certificate of sale has already been set forth. It is composed
almost entirely of symbols, figures, abbreviations and contractions. The statute in force at the time the certificate
was made provided that in the assessment of land or the
advertisement and sale thereof for taxes initial letters,
abbreviations, and figures may be used to designate the
township, range, section or parts of sections (80-11-6, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933). It will be observed that the
statute does not authorize the use of initial letters, abbreviations or figures in the certificate of sale but for the purposes of this argument we shall assume it is broad enough
to warrant the use of symbols and abbreviations in a certificate of sale. We do, however, emphasize that the use of
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initial letters and abbreviations is authorized for no other
purpose than to designate township, range, section or parts
of section. It follows that symbols, abbreviations and figures
to designate starting points, courses, distances or natural
boundaries is without statutory justification. In Tintic
Undine Mining Company v. Ercanbrack, supra, this court
said that a description of the property in the certificate of
sale "must be definite enough so the owner will know just
what property is being sold and a prospective purchaser
will know what particular property he could buy so as to
determine its value." The test thus announced was undoubtedly sufficient to dispose of that case. The court did not
attempt to confine the test to any definite limitations. It
is therefore entirely permissible to adopt a more comprehensive test without in any way impairing the decision in
the Ercanbrack case. In the case of Buckner v. Sugg, 96
S. W. 184, it is said :
"The description in tax proceedings must be such
as will fully apprise the owner without recourse to
the superior knowledge peculiar to him as owner that
the particular tract of his land is sought to be charged
with a tax lien. It must be such as will notify the
public what lands are to be offered for sale in case
the tax be not paid,"
and in Cooper v. Lee, supra, it is said that a description which is intelligible only to persons possessing more
than the average intelligence, or the use and understanding
of which is confined to the locality in which the land lies
is not sufficient. It must be remembered in testing the sufficiency of a property description in a tax certificate we are
not searching for the intent of the parties to the instru-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

11
ment. The maker of the document does not intend to convey
anything. Neither does the owner of the property by such
an instrument convey or intend to convey anything. All
that can be said is that the certificate affects no property
except that which comes within the legal meaning of the
language used.
In Devlin on Deeds, Section 1408, the author states the
rule governing the interpretation of tax deeds as follows :
"The rule governing descriptions in tax deeds is
thus stated by Mr. Justice Ruggles: 'In a deed between individuals, a part of the premises conveyed
may be rejected on account of its falsity, if after
its rejection there is enough left to show clearly
what the owner intended to convey. In this case, if
the owner of the land had executed the deed, giving
the boundaries correctly, the title might have passed,
although the land was falsely described as to the
village in which it lay. It would then present the
question what the owner intended to convey. There
is no such question here. The owner conveys nothing,
and does not intend to convey anything. If the officers who undertake to convey for him intend to convey lands lying on one place by a deed describing
them as lying in a different place, they intend to do
what the statute, under which they profess to act,
-does not permit. . . ' "
It will be observed that the property is described in
the certificate of sale by means of abbreviation of starting
points, initial letters to indicate the meridian, figures and
initials to indicate courses and distances, ends of courses
and quantities. Many words necessary to make a definite
and intelligable description are omitted. The manner in
which the figures are arranged in the description makes it
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impossible to determine what the total figure might be,
thus rendering the distances and boundaries uncertain.
Not even an experienced conveyancer or one possessing
superior knowledge of conveying could say with any degree
of certainty what property is affected by the certificate.
It would require parol evidence and a decree of court to
resolve the uncertainties and ambiguities and fix the location and boundaries of the property. The description wholly
fails to meet the tests laid down under the authorities cited
and therefore makes the certificate void.
There is even a more fatal error in the description
than that which is created by the abbreviations, initial letters, symbols, figures and omissions above referred to. It
is impossible to determine the starting point of the second
parcel. It purports to be some distance from the "above
Sec." Assuming the word "Sec." stands for section it is
impossible to know what section is meant. Two sections are
referred to above the words "above Sec." One is Section
34 and the other is Section 33. The one next above is Section 33. If the words "above Sec." refer to Section 33 then
it relates to property that is not involved in this litigation
and is not embraced within the tax deed under which the
plaintiff claims. The logical section referred to by the
words "above Sec." would be the section next above referred to, which is Section 33. To say the least, we have
thus created an ambiguity in the description which cannot
be removed since we cannot resort to extrinsic evidence.
Whether this description would be valid if contained in a
deed between individuals is a matter of no concern because
we are not dealing with any question of intention of the
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party executing the certificate. It most assuredly is not
definite enough or certain enough to enable a person with
average intelligence to know just what property was being
sold. Without the aid of parol evidence it would not be
possible for even a person possessing superior knowledge
of conveyancing to determine what property is affected.
We submit that under the decisions above cited the description of the property in the certificate of sale must be
held to be so uncertain and ambiguous as to render the
certificate of no force or effect.
II. THE BURDEN RESTS UPON THE PLAINTIFF
TO PROVE THAT THE STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS
OF A VALID MAY SALE WERE STRICTLY COMPLIED
WITH.

Utah Lead Company v. Piute County, 92 Utah 1,
65 Pac. (2) 1190.
Tintic Undine Mining Co. v. Ercanbrack, 93
Utah 561, 74 P. (2) 1184.
Jungk v. Snyder, 28 Utah 1, 78 P. 168.
Moon v. Salt Lake County, 27 Utah 435, 76 P.
222.
Asper v. Moon, 24 Utah, 241, 67 P. 409.
Bean v. Fairbanks, 46 Utah 513, 151 P. 338.
Hatch v. Edwards, 72 Utah 113, 269 P. 138.
Olson v. Bagley, 10 Utah 492, 37 P. 739.
Eastman v. Gurrey, 15 Utah 410, 49 P. 310.
Wall v. Kaighn, 144 P. 1100, 45 Utah 244.
Buck v. Canty, 121 P. 924.
Brokaw v. Cottrell, 211 N. W. 184.
Golden, etc. v. Miller, 220 N. W. 839.
Davis v. Minnesota Baptist Convention, 16' P.
(2) 48.
Hodgkin v. Boswell, 127 P. 985.
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Gage v. Pumpelly, 115 U. S. 454, 6 S. Ct. 136,
29 L. Ed. 449.

At the time this sale was held the controlling statu~
tory provisions are to be found in Section 80-10-68, Session
Laws of Utah, 1933. This section provides that whenever
a county has received a tax deed for any property sold for
delinquent taxes the Board of County Commissioners must
during the month of May in each year, after publication,
offer for sale at the front door of the county courthouse
at the time specified in the notice to the highest bidder each
parcel of real estate which has been conveyed to the county
during the calendar year pursuant to the provisions of
Section 80-10-66. The first bid received in an amount
sufficient to pay the taxes, penalties, interest and costs,
including all taxes assessed subsequently to the date of the
certificate of sale shall be accepted unless a further bid in
an amount sufficient to pay said taxes, penalties, interest
and costs for less than the entire parcel, shall be received,
and the highest bid shall be construed to mean the bid of
that bidder who will pay in cash the full amount of the
taxes, penalties, interest and costs for the smallest portion
of the entire parcel. The Board of County Commissioners
shall at any time after the period of redemption has expired
and before the sale, as herein provided, permit the redemp·
tion of such property.

It is as clear as can be made by the written word
that the owner of property retains at least a qualified
interest in it until it has been divested by the proceedings
outlined in Section 80-10-68. Whether that interest be
described as a right of redemption or some other legal or
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equitable estate is a matter of no importance. Unquestion..
ably it is a valuable property right. The owner cannot be
be divested of it except in the manner prescribed by the
statute. Unless and until there has been "the sale as herein
provided," the owner retains his qualified estate in the
property. This is so because the County Commissioners
must permit the owner to redeem his property. Since the
statute says that the right of redemption persists until sale
is had "as herein provided," a sale which is not in accord..
ance with the directions specified in the statute would
leave the right of redemption unimpaired. It inevitably
follows also that the purchaser at an irregular sale would
acquire no title. As authority for these almost self-evident
propositions we have the decision of this court in the recent
case of Utah Lead Company v. Piute County, supra, wherein
the County Commissioners undertook to sell property with~
out having first offered it at the May sale. It is there said:
"The· County Commissioners have no authority
to sell tax title land privately until the public sale was
had. The sale to Young therefore of parcel number
1 was void."
Since a valid May sale is jurisdictional to divest the
owner of his qualified estate and also to vest in the purchaser at such a sale any title, it was incumbent upon the
plaintiff in this action to prove that the sale was 'conducted in strict accordance with the requirements of the
statute. It must be kept in mind that at the time the
plaintiff acquired his deed there was no statute making
his deed prima facie evidence of either the facts recited in
it or the regularity of any proceedings leading up to it.
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In the absence of such a statute nothing is presumed in
aid of the plaintiff's title. Without affirmative proof of
strict compliance with the statute plaintiff fails to show
any title. As pointed out by this court repeatedly, the last
time in Tintic Undine Mining Co. v. Ercanbrack, supra:
"It is elemental, and settled beyond argument
in this jurisdiction, that tax sale proceedings and
statutes are strictissimi juris. The sales are made
exclusively under statutory authority. The seller is
making a sale not coupled with an interest, and derives his authority solely from the statute, and it is
derived from no rule or principle of the common law.
He can have no authority to sell except as he is made
the agent of the law for that purpose, and, if the
steps necessaary to precede his, action fail, he is not
invested with legal right to make the sale; if one step
fails, they all fail. The rule, therefore, is that all
the preliminary requirements of the statute, made
conditions to the exercise of the right and power to
sell, and designating the various proceedings which
culminate in the sale, must have been strictly complied with. The officers who execute this power
should follow the steps outlined for its exercise with
precision. It is, a special jurisdiction and must be
strictly pursued. As was said in Wister v. Kemmerer, 2 Yates 100, 'An exact and punctual adherence to
the laws can alone divest the title of lands on a sale
for nonpayment of taxes.' When the statutes governing the sale of lands for taxes direct an act to be done,
or the manner, time, form, or place of doing it, such
act must be done as prescribed, and the statutes must
be strictly, if not literally, complied with."

In Olsen v. Bagley, supra, the law is thus stated:
"The title to be acquired under statutes authorizing the sale of land for the nonpayment of taxes is
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regarded as stricti juris, and whoever sets up a tax
title must show that all the requirements of the law
have been complied with."
In Eastman

v. Gurrey, supra, it is said:

"In this case it was the duty of the plaintiff, as
purchaser and holder of the tax deed, to show the
regularity of all the proceedings. Bucknall v. Story,
36 Cal. 67: Marx v. Hanthorn, 148, U. S. 172, 13
Sup. Ct. 508."
And again in Asper v. Moon, supra:
"The requirements of the statute in this respect
are essential, and the appellant has failed to show
that they have been complied with."
In the case of Davis v. Minnesota Baptist Convention,
supra, is a very clear statement of the point.
"It is also clear that, in the absence of a stat~te
changing the rule, when a plaintiff in such a suit relies upon a tax deed to establish a perfect title in himself, 'the validity of a tax-sale will not be presumed
from the mere deed of the collector unaccompanied
by proof of the prior proceedings and their validity.
On the contrary, in the absence of an enabling statute, the burden is upon any person who claims title to
land derived from a sale thereof for taxes to prove,
affirmatively and by proper evidence, that every
mandatory provision of the law under which the sale
was effected was strictly complied with, that each
step in the proceedings, from the assessment of the
taxes to the execution of the deed, was formally and
regularly taken by the officers or persons legally authorized, and that he or his grantor was the purchaser at the sale.' 37 Cyc. 1452 and cases cited; 4 Cooley's Law of Taxation (4th Ed.) 3024, Sec. 1550, and
cases cited."
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The jurisdictional requirements of a valid May sale,
which under the authorities cited, must be affirmatively established by the plaintiff in order to prevail in this action
are:
(a) A proper notice of the time and place of sale
published in a newspaper having general circulation in the
county.
(b) That less than the entire tract was first offered
for the amount of the taxes properly assessed.
{c) That no sufficient bid was made for less than the
whole of the property.
(d) That the property was sold for the amount of the
taxes properly assessed.
The record of this case will be searched in vain for a
single word of evidence tending to establish any of these
indispensable requisites of a valid sale. Although a notice
of sale was put into evidence there was no proof that it
was published in a newspaper having general circulation in the county, or that it was posted in five public
places. The statute, of course, requires a public auction
at which the property is offered to the best bidder. The
best bidder is the one who offers the amount of the taxes
plus interest, penalties, and cost for the smallest portion
of the property. In this case the property consisted of
several acres divided into two parcels each separately describe4. The County Commissioners were therefore required to first offer the parcels separately. Such is the
very minimum requirement of the law. Only in the event
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that no bid was made for either parcel could the Commissioners offer the entire property. Since the May sale
is the procedure which cuts off the qualified estate of the
owner (sometimes described as the right of redemption)
it is a proceeding in invitum and no presumption can be
indulged that the public officials performed their duties
in conducting the sale. There being no affirmative proof
that proper notice was given or that the sale was properly
conducted there is a missing link in the plaintiff's chain
of title.
Not only is there an absence of proof of a valid sale,
there is affirmative proof of a void sale. The amount of
the taxes for the year 1933, including interest and penalties,
for which the property was sold to Davis County, was the
sum of $127.40. The property was sold to the plaintiff for
the sum of $643.40. The difference between the two sums
apparently represents the amount of taxes assessed subsequent to the year 1933, although there was no evidence
showing the amount of these assessments. It was established that the assessment of taxes subsequent to the year
1933 was invalid. As pointed out in the statement of facts
on the 7th day of December, 1933 James Farnworth conveyed to Alice Farnworth eighty acres of the property described as:
"Beginning at the Northeast corner of Section
34, Township 2 North, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Meridian, running thence South 22 5/7 rods, thence
West to the Jordan River, thence northerly along the
east bank of the Jordan River to the north line of
Section 33, Township and Range aforesaid, thence
East to the point of beginning,"
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the deed being recorded April 2, 1934. The record title to
the rest of the property remained in James Farnworth.
Notwithstanding the fact that James Farnworth appeared
at all times to be the owner of record and whose address
was known to the assessor, all of the property was, beginning in the year 1934 and thereafter, assessed to Alice
Farnworth.
The statute (Section 80-5-12, Revised Statutes of Utah,
1933) provides that if the name of the owner or claimant
of any property is known to the assessor or if it appears
of record in the office of the county recorder where the
property is situated the property must be assessed to such
name; if unknown to the assessor, and if it does not appear
of record as aforesaid, the property must be assessed to unknown owners. Section 80-5-4, R. S. Utah, 1933, provides
that the county assessor must ascertain the names of all
taxable inhabitants and all property in the county subject
to taxation and must assess such property to the person
by whom it was owned or claimed or in whose possession or
control it was at 12:00 noon on the first day of January
next preceding. No mistake in the name of the owner or
supposed owner of property renders the assessment thereof invalid. Construing these sections, this court in Tintic
Undine Mining Co. v. Ercanbrack, supra, held that when
the name of the owner appears of record in the office of the
county recorder the property must be assessed to such
person and that an assessment of property in the name of
"A" when it stands on the record in the name of "B" is
not a mistake in the name of the owner as that term is
used in the statute. The court there said:
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" ...... What then is the meaning of the italicized
sentence about a 'mistake in the name'? Clearly, that
means when the owner is unknown to the assessor
and does not appear of record in the recorder's office,
the property may be assessed to the claimant, or to
the unknown owners and the claimant, or to the person in possession. Or, if my property, which should
be assessed to Martin M. Larson, was assessed to
Martin A. Larson or perhaps to Morten M. Larson,
that would be a mistake in the name of the owner
which would not affect the validity of the assessment. But to assess my property in the name of W.
H. Folland is not a mistake in the name of the owner
but is an assessment in the name of another person
not the owner. The clause does not mention mistakes
in the ownership, in the person who is the owner,
but mistakes in the name of the owner."

~;

;''•

.....
.>

In that case the property was assessed in part to a
stranger to the record owner. There were other errors, but
the decision makes plain the point that an assessment of
property in the name of "A" when the record title stands
in the name of "B" is a void assessment. In the face of
this decision and the prior cases above cited there is not
the faintest basis for a contention that an assessment to
Alice Farnworth of property standing upon the records in
the name of James Farnworth is a mere mistake in the
name of the owner. By the conveyance from James Farnworth to Alice Farnworth there was a segregation of the
property into two parcels. It then became the duty of the
assessor to assess one parcel to Alice Farnworth and the
other parcel to James Farnworth. Instead of performing
this duty, he assessed the entire property to Alice Farn-
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worth. The assessments were a nullity and could create no
lien against the property.

It being established that the assessments beginning
with the year 1935 were void and that the county offered
and sold the property for a sum including these illegal
assessments, the only inquiry remaining is whether the sale
is thereby rendered invalid.
It is submitted that the decisions of this court and
the plain intent of the statute require an affirmative answer
to this question. It is expressly decided in the case of Utah
Lead Company v. Piute County, supra, that a May sale
conducted in the manner outlined in the statute is a condition precedent to the right of the county to sell property
which it has taken over for delinquent taxes. Such a sale
is the only method of bringing about a forfeiture of the
owner's qualified estate in the property. While one of the
purposes of the May sale is to collect the taxes due and get
the property back on the tax rolls, another equally obvious
purpose is to protect the owner's interest by requiring the
County Commissioners to offer and sell at public auction
the smallest part of the property that will realize the amount
of the taxes due. In other words, the purpose is to enable the
county to collect the taxes due it with the least possible
loss to the owner. Surely no one will contend that if the
Commissioners sold a portion of the property for enough
to pay the delinquent taxes the part unsold would remain
the property of the county. Such a sale would operate as a
redemption of the part not sold. The unsold portion would
either remain in the owner or would revert to him by operation of law.
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Since the May sale is simply a part of the procedure
for the collection of taxes and since the county is required
to sell the smallest portion of the property that will realize
the amount of the taxes due, it would completely frustrate
the evident purpose and intent of the statute if it should be
held that the county could offer and sell the property for
more than the amount of the taxes lawfully assessed. It
would be equivalent to holding that the county can use the
property which it acquires by auditor's deed for speculative
purposes. Since the county holds the property solely for
collecting the taxes and is required to collect those taxes
out of ·the smallest parcel, it inevitably follows that a sale
for more than the taxes actually due is in violation of law
and transfers no title to the purchaser.
There is and can be no distinction between the case at
bar and the case where the invalid assessment was levied
prior to the issuance of the certificate of sale. It is true
that in the latter case the County has no title whatever at
the time of the May sale, whereas in the present case we
are assuming that the certificate of sale and the auditor's
deed are valid. In either situation the property· is sold for
taxes that are not due which is the thing the statute does
not permit.
It is inaccurate to say that the county under the 1933
statute acquires the title or ownership of the property by
virtue of the certificate of sale and a~ditor's deed. What
it actually acquires is merely a lien for the taxes that are
due. It is only by virtue of a valid May sale that it acquires
any greater estate.

That a tax sale of property is void if the property is
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sold for more than the amount of taxes lawfully assessed
has long been the settled law of every jurisdiction where the
question has arisen. In Hodgkin v. Boswell, supra, the plaintiff sought to set aside a tax deed to the defendant and
quiet title. The sale under which the defendant claimed
was made for delinquent taxes for the years 1895, 1896,
1897, 1898 and 1899. In the years 1895 and 1896 the property was assessed to the plaintiff under his correct name,
Frank E. Hodgkin. In the remaining years it was assessed
to F. E. Hodgkins. The sale was a lump sum for all taxes.
The statute of Oregon like our own required the property
to be assessed in the name of the owner. The Supreme Court
of Oregon held that the assessments in the name of F. E.
Hodgkins were void, and since the sale was for taxes which
were in part illegally assessed it was void and the purchaser
acquired no title. The following quotation is made from the
opinion:
"It is true that for two years (1895 and 1896)
the property appears to have been assessed against
plaintiff under his correct name; but, where legal
and illegal items are grouped together in a single sale,
the whole sale is void on account of the excessive
levy. We quote from Cooley on Taxation (2d Ed.) p.
497: 'It has been shown in a preceding chapter that
an excessive levy is void, whether it is made excessive
by including with lawful taxes those. which are unlawful, or in any other manner. If the levy would be
void, there would, of course, be nothing to uphold a
sale. And, if a valid levy were to be increased afterwards by unlawful additions, the sale would be equally bad. The statutory power is a power to sell for
lawful taxes and lawful expenses, and, if it is exceeded by including unlawful items of either class,
the power is exceeded, and its exercise is invalid in
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toto from the manifest impossibility of saving the
sale in part when the invalidity extends to the whole.
It is to be presumed, when the sale has been made for
a sum in part illegal, that some undefined and undefinable portion of the land has gone to satisfy an illegal demand, and that such part would not have been
sold at all if only what was lawful had been called
for.'"
In Gage v. Pumpelly, supra, the statute provided that
the owner of property should have a certain period to redeem
after the sale of the property. The county court having
jurisdiction ordered the property sold for delinquent taxes
which it found to be due and the property was pursuant
to the judgment sold. Part of the taxes for which the county
court ordered the property sold had not in fact been properly assessed. The Supreme Court held that under the controlling decisions of the State the sale was void. We quote
from the opinion :
"But the latest adjudication by the State court
of the question under consideration was Riverside
Co. v. Howell, 113 Ill. 259. That was ejectment for
the recovery of land, the defendant claiming title under a tax deed based upon a judgment of the County
Court. The validity of the sale was questioned upon
the ground, among others, that a part of the taxes,
for the non-payment of which the sale was ordered,
were illegal and void. The argument was made there,
as in this case, that the judgment of the County
Court was conclusive as to all matters that could, or
ougbt to have been, passed upon in rendering it, and
if it included too much taxes., or illegal taxes, it was
only error to be remedied by appeal. But the court,
finding that certain taxes included in the judgment
were invalid, held that no title passed by the sale,
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observing that 'the authorities are to the effect, that
when a part of the tax for which a sale of real estate
is made is illegal, the sale is void,' citing M.cLaughlin
v. Thompson, 55 Ill. 249; Kemper v. M cClelmnd's
Lessee, 19 Ohio, 308; Gamble v. Witty, 55 Miss. 26;
Cooley on Taxation, 295, 296; Hardenburg v. Kidd,
10 Cal. 402."
The proposition has been fully adopted in this juris.
diction by the decision in Asper v. Moon, supra, wherein a
partially invalid assessment was involved. The sale included
the amount of the invalid assessment and it was held that
it was void. Although there were other objections to the
assessment, the court expressly decided that the partial
invftlidity of the assessment nuilified the sale. The decision
concludes thus :
" ...... And as one of the lots was wrongfully assessed, and the amount of such assessment was not
deducted from the amount of the assessment for
which the lots classified with said lot were offered
for sale and sold the sale of said lots was void, under
said decisions."

It appears from the tax deed that the amount of the
delinquent taxes including penalties, interest and costs on
the date of the May sale was $643.40. Apparently, the
amount bid by the plaintiff was $656.30. He introduced
in evidence his check to Davis County for the last stated
amount as evidence of the amount bid at the sale. If the
recitals in the deed are correct, then the property was sold
for more than the amount of taxes, penalties, interest and
costs, even if all assessments were regular and valid. No
attempt was made to show how much taxes were actually
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due and there was nothing to indicate that the recital of
the amount of taxes in the deed to the plaintiff was incorrect. It is thus conclusively demonstrated that the property was sold for more than the amount of taxes due even
if it be assumed that all assessments are valid. This, as we
have shown above is in violation of the statute and renders
the sale void.

III. THE COUNTY AUDITOR IS WITHOUT
POWER TO EXECUTE A DEED ON BEHALF OF THE
COUNTY TO A PURCHASER AT THE MAY SALE AND
A DEED SO EXECUTED CONVEYS NOTHING.

Mathews v. Blake, 92 P. 242.
Sayre v. Sage, 108 P. 160.
Macbeth v. Stunkard, 164 N. E. 711.
At the time the tax deed to the plaintiff was issued the
statute (80-10-68, Session Laws of Utah, 1933) provided
that when property has been sold at the May sale the
County Clerk is authorized to execute deeds in the name of
the county and attest the same by his seal vesting in the purchaser all of the title of the State, of the county, and of
each city, town, school or other taxing district interest in
the real estate so sold. No deed so executed is to be found
in the record nor is there any deed which by any rules of construction could be said to be in even substantial compliance
with this statute. On the contrary, the deed under which
the plaintiff claims is executed by the auditor of Davis
County and is acknowledged and attested by such auditor.
It might be noted in passing that the statute referred to
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was amended so as to authorize the auditor to execute the
deed on behalf of the county and provides form of such
deed. The amendment, however, did not go into effect
until long after the deed to the plaintiff was issued. It is
thus apparent that the county auditor had no more power
or authority to execute the deed under which the plaintiff
claims than an ordinary private citizen would have. It
was as ineffectual to vest any title in plaintiff as a blank
piece of paper. No rule of tax title law is more firmly
established than the one which announces that a public
{)fficial who executes a tax deed on behalf of the county
or state acts under a naked power and cannot divest either
the county or the owner of any interest in the property exeept by an exact compliance with the statute creating the
power. In Macbeth v. Stunkard, supra, the plaintiff claimed
under a tax deed. The statute required that tax deeds shall
be executed by the county auditor under his hand and seal
and witnessed by the county treasurer and acknowledged
before the county recorder or any other officer authorized
to take acknowledgments. The certificate of acknowledgment annexed to the deed under which the plaintiff claimed
title recited that the deed was acknowledged by the county
auditor before George E. Hubbard who signed the certificate without indicating that he was an officer of any kind.
The opinion says :
" ...... So far as the tax deed and the certificate of
acknowledgment are concerned, there is. nothing to
indicate that Hubbard was authorized to take the acknowledgment. The deed, not being acknowledged as
required by law, was not entitled to be recorded. Not
being executed as required by the statute, it was
neither prima facie evidence of the regularity of the
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sale and the prior proceedings, nor was it prima facie,
evidence of a good and valid title in the grantee
named in the deed. We hold the tax deed was invalid,
in so far as it attempted to convey any title to Agnes
Donahey."
In Mathews v. Blake, supra, the tax deed involved purported to be signed by the treasurer of the county and acknowledged before a notary public. The statute required it
to be acknowledged by the treasurer before the clerk of the
District Court. The Supreme Court of Wyoming held that
such a deed was void and was not even admissible in evidence to show color of title under the adverse possession
statute.
" ...... Where the statute directs the execution of a
deed by a public officer, and requires it to be executed
in a particular manner and to be witnessed or acknowledged before a particular officer, the witnessing or acknowI edging of the deed in that manner is
a part of its execution, and without such witnessing
or acknowledgment is void upon its face. The rule is
stated in Black on Tax Titles, Section 208, as follows:
'A rule of primary importance is that the execution
of a tax deed must conform strictly to the statute;
that is, any directions which the law may give in regard to its signature, seal, witnesses, or acknowledgment must be duly complied with, or the conveyance
will be invalidated. Thus, if the act requires that tax
deeds shall be authenticated by the addition of the
seal of the county, and this be omitted, the deed will
be void ; nor will it even be admissible to show color
of title under the special limitation of the revenue
act.' It was held in Reed v. Merriam, 15 Neb. 323, 18
N. W. 137, that, 'whatever may have been the object
of the Legislature in requiring the treasurer to attest the execution of a tax deed by his seal, the proSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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vision is one that cannot be dispensed with, and the
want of a seal is no valid excuse. A treasurer acts
under a naked statutory power in executing a tax
deed, and, unless he comply with the provisions of
the statute, the deed will be void.' "
In Sayre v. Sage, supra, the statute required the tax
deed to be attested by the official or private seal of the
treasurer. The deed in question bore no such seal and the
Supreme Court of Colorado held it to be void.
" ...... The treasurer, in executing such deed, acts
under a naked statutory power, and in order that it
shall be valid, it must comply substantially with the
provisions of the statute prescribing its form. That
it must be attested by the official or private seal of
the treasurer is a positive requirement of the statute,
and is as necessary to its validity as any other. Without one or the other of the seals specified it is void.
Sutton v. Young, 4 Neb. 319; Deputron v. Young, 134
U. S. 241, 10 Sup. Ct. 539, 33 L. Ed. 923; Gue v. Jones,
25 Neb. 634,41 N. W. 555; Reed v. Merriam, 15 Neb.
323, 18 N. W. 137; Gage v. Starkweather, 103 Ill.
559 ; Reed v. Morse, 51 Kan. 141, 32 Pac. 900."
The deed in question having been executed by an officer without authority to do so was wholly ineffectual to
vest any title whatever in the plaintiff. It was as ineffectual
as it would be if executed by the plaintiff's attorney.
In the remaining pages of this brief we shall assume
for the purpose of argument that all of the proceedings
leading up to the tax deed issued to the plaintiff were in
all respects regular and in strict conformity with the statute.
We shall assume further that plaintiff acquired an apparent
title under his deed. Upon these assumptions we will now
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endeavor to demonstrate that whatever title plaintiff acquired at the tax sale must be decreed to be held by him
as a trustee and is not such title as will divest the appellants
of their interests in the property. In other words, the
payment made by the plaintiff to Davis County and the
issuance of the deed were a mere redemption from the
delinquent tax sales.

IV. THE PURCHASE BY THE PLAINTIFF OF
THE PROPERTY AT THE MAY SALE WAS MADE
FOR THE PURPOSE OF DEFRAUDING THE APPELLANTS OF THEIR INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY AND
THEREFORE OPERATED SIMPLY ASAREDEMPTION.

Guldner v. Guldner, 203 N. W. 289.
Adams v. Snyder, 20 P. (2) 827.
Blotcky v. Solberman, 281 N. W. 496.
Fair v. Brown, 40 Iowa 209.
Turner v. Edwards, 292 N. W. 257.
First Congregational Church v. Terry, 107 N.
w. 305
Adams v. Snyder, 20 P. (2) 827.
Quinby v. Meyer, 148 So. 869.
Riley v. Bank, 23 P. (2) 362.
Baird v. Fischer, 220 N. W. 892.
Des Moines Bank v. Eisenmenger, 235 N. W. 390.
Norton v. Myers, 77 N. W. 298.
Chrisman v. Hough, 47 S. W. 941.
McCready v. Fredericksen, 41 Utah 388, 126 P.
316.
McAlpine v. Zitser, 10 N. E. 901.

IS
~
~·

It is impossible to read the evidence even in the most
casual manner without being at once convinced that the
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purchase of this property by the plaintiff was the final act
of a conspiracy to deprive the appellants of their interests
therein. The participants in the scheme were the defendant
Alice F'arnworth, her attorney, D. A. Skeen, and the plaintiff. The defendant Alice Farnworth had previously attemped to forfeit the interests of the Jensens created by
the exchange agreement between her and them. She then
decided to resort to the old and familiar device of cutting
off bothersome liens by acquiring a tax title. She realized,
of course, that she could not acquire the tax title in her
own name. Accordingly, she appealed to her old and trusted
friend, the plaintiff. She informed him that she was about
to lose this property and beseeched him for aid. She prevailed upon him to go to the office of fier attorney who
likewise was a friend of the plaintiff. Here in this conference the details of the plan were worked out. It was
decided that the plaintiff should bid in the property and hold
it for the benefit of Farnworth and Skeen. It is true that
the plaintiff did not expressly state in his testimony that
he agreed to bid in and hold the property for the benefit
of Farnworth and Skeen, but the undisputed facts and his
admissions establish that agreement beyond any reasonable
doubt. Those facts and admissions likewise establish with
certainty that Farnworth and Skeen agreed to protect and
save the plaintiff harmless should the tax title fail and that
if it should be upheld the property would be either reconveyed to Farnworth and Skeen or sold and the proceeds
divided among them. It it not necessary to resort to any
inferences to discover that the arrangement and plan were
as above outlined.
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In the first place Skeen was Mrs. Farnworth's attorney at the time the property was bid in and had been
such for a number of years. She was indebted to him for
legal services and the mortgage which he set up in this action
was given to secure payment for those services. He was
likewise the attorney and friend of the plaintiff. He prepared the complaint in this action. She is the one who
agreed to pay Skeen for preparing this complaint and
~
clearing the title. Skeen undertook to clear the title without
any obligation whatever being incurred by the plaintiff.
Under this arrangement it is most natural that we would
expect the defendants Farnworth and Skeen to default in
the action. That is precisely what they did. It is impossible to overestimate the significance of these defaults. It
indicates the fullest cooperation with the plaintiff. While
nominally named as defendants they are in reality plaintiffs. If the plaintiff in this action purchased this property
for his own use and benefit why should he call upon the
attorney of Mrs. Farnworth to prepare this complaint and
why should Mr. Skeen prepare this complaint without any
charge whatever to the plaintiff? The plaintiff insisted
.. in his testimony that he purchased this property at the
urgent solicitation of the defendant Alice Farnworth and
D. A. Skeen and that he bid in the property solely for the
;. . purpose of protecting them.
"Q. And you bid it in at his solicitation and at
his request and at the request of Mrs. Alice Farnworth? That is true isn't it?
"A. Well, not absolutely. I wouldn't say a request. They solicited me and wanted me to.
"Q.

Mr. Skeen and Mrs. Farnworth solicited
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you and prevailed upon you to come with her and bid
in this property at the sale?
"A. Yes.
"Q. And you bid it in to protect Mrs. Alice
Farnworth and Mr. Skeen, didn't you?
"A. Not Mr. Skeen particularly at all.
"Q. All right, we will make it Mrs. Farnworth.
That is correct isn't it?
"A. Yes. I might say this, Mr. Bagley, as you
have in your deposition there, that I first made this
first loan down on the Sugarhouse property. I became very well acquainted with those people ..... .
and my sympathy rather went out to the family as
they told me about their condition, and so on, and
when this situation came along they told me about
their going to lose this property out here in Davis
County and they solicited me and wanted me to help
them out, and I told them no, that I wasn't interested
and the son came down a number of times and tried
to get me to help him out, and I finally told him that
I would rather not. He then wanted to know if I
wouldn't come up to the office and talk it over with
he and Mr. Skeen, so I went up and talked the situation all through with Mr. Skeen and him and I finally decided that I wouid help them out in doing so.
And in our conversation I told Mr. Skeen and Mr.
Farnworth as I told Mr. Farnworth before at my own
office that I was only doing it because of the interest
and my sympathy went out to them and I would like
to help them if I could. And I told Mr. Skeen the
same thing."
He then discussed with Mr. Skeen the matter of the fee
owing by the Farnworths to Skeen.
"And I told him that my interest was simply to see
that they were protected all the way through, the
Farnworths, and that he would be fair in taking care
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of the account and whatever came he would be fair
in taking care of the account with Mr. Farnworth."
"Q. Now, if you should prevail in this action,
of course you have no intention of depriving lV,Ir.
Skeen of his mortgage lien on the property have
you?
"A. Oh, no, no.
"Q. And you have no intention of depriving
Mrs. Farnworth of any interest that she has in the
property?
"A. Why, no.
"Q. In other words, you bid in this property to
protect them and to help them out, didn't you?
"A. Yes. I did it as an accommodation all the
way through to clear the property and make a satisfactory arrangement to everybody."

-·

-·
~

~

a.:

Of course, this testimony completely eliminates any
thought or suggestion that the plaintiff bid in the property
for any purpose other than for the use and benefit of
Farnworth and Skeen. By these statements and admissions he completely strips himself of the character of a
good-faith bidder at a tax sale. Whether by this testimony
he clothes himself with the robes of a trustee or those of
a mere agent it is not necessary to determine. The law
fastens one or the other status upon him because he participated in a fraudulent device. He made himself a party
to the scheme of Farnworth and Skeen to cut off the
rights of appellants in this property. The plaintiff repeatedly speaks of protecting the interests of Farnworth and Skeen.
What did the interests of Farnworth and Skeen need protection against? Certainly they would have no interest
to protect if the plaintiff bid in the property for himself.
Assuming the tax sale to be valid, if the plaintiff became
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a purchaser in his own right, everybody would be cut off.
It is apparent that Farnworth and Skeen needed protection
against the outstanding and superior title and lien of the
appellants. The result of the plaintiff's admissions, therefore, is that he purchased this property for the purpose of
freeing it from the appellants' interests and thus protect
Farnworth and Skeen. Farnworth employed Skeen to prepare the complaint which would clear the title. It is selfevident, therefore, that when the plaintiff speaks of clearing the title he means clearing it of the claims of the appellant. The purpose of clearing the title was to protect Farnworth and Skeen.
If Farnworth or Skeen had furnished the money to
the plaintiff to bid in the property no court would hesitate
a moment to hold that the transaction was a mere redemption
from the tax sale. What actually took place in this case is
exactly equivalent to that supposition. Skeen agreed with
the plaintiff to take the property over as soon as the
plaintiff bid it in.
The latter testified:
"A. As a matter of fact, Mr. Bagley, Mr. Skeen
assured me he would take it off my hands.
"Q. Mr. D. A. Skeen assured you that he will
protect you and take this property that you bid in at
the sale off your hands?
"A. Yes.
"Q. That was the understanding?
"A. That was the fact in the case, Mr. Bagley."

As a matter of fact, on the same day that plaintiff bid in
the property he and Skeen entered into a written agreement
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whereby Skeen undertook to purchase the property. While
this written agreement contains language appropriate to
an option it is clear that it was the intention of the parties
to enter into a binding agreement and that such is the legal
effect to be given to the instrument. But whether this
document incorporates binding agreement or not is immaterial, for the evidence, as we have pointed out, clearly
shows that there was an understanding and oral agreement
between the plaintiff and Skeen whereby the latter should
take over the property after it had been bid in by the
plaintiff.

The written agreement referred to is a most significant
document and itself reveals the attempt of the parties to
obscure the conspiracy that existed to deprive the appellants of their rights in the property. In the first place, the
date of the instrument has been altered. 'The date when it
was actually entered into and the date which it originally
bore is May 15th. The "15" is obliterated and the figures
"22nd" inserted in lieu thereof. The date of its acceptance
by the plaintiff is May 15th. It recites: "I (Skeen) understand you have purchased the property ... at the May
tax sale . . . I have not checked the tax proceedings."
- As a matter of fact, Skeen knew that plaintiff had purchased the property at the May sale because he accompanied the plaintiff to Farmington and was present when
the latter bid in the property. The plaintiff testified that
· · Skeen examined the tax proceedings before the bid was made
and assured the plaintiff that they were regular and in
:~ due form. Although Skeen was present in court when the
plaintiff gave his testimony as above he did not undertake
~~:
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to deny it or qualify it in any way. Skeen further says in
the agreement that he was not in a position to purchase the
property at the tax sale. At a later point in this brief
we will make it perfectly clear just why Skeen was not in
a position to bid in the property himself. He then graciously undertakes to institute and prosecute for the plaintiff
any action necessary to quiet title to the property in consideration of plaintiff giving a first and prior option to
purchase the property, "in order that I might realize on
my mortgage." The amount of the purchase price fixed in
the agreement is the exact amount of the bid made by the
plaintiff with interest and expenses added. Skeen apparently
later discovered that the amount of the expenses should
be fixed in a minimum amount in order to make it appear
that the plaintiff was making a profit in selling the property. He therefore inserted the words in his own handwriting "not less than $50.00" after the word "expenses."
It will be observed from the agreement that Skeen proposes to bring a suit to quiet title in the plaintiff notwithstanding he assumes that the tax pro.ceedings are valid
and vested in the plaintiff the title free and clear of all
liens, judgments, etc. We have heretofore demonstrated
that there was no occasion to bring any suit to quiet title
as against Mrs. Farnworth and surely Skeen would not
propose to quiet title against himself. The proposal to
quiet title, therefore, was to eliminate the appellants. As
stated in the agreement Skeen was "not in a position to
purchase the property at tax sale myself" because being
a lawyer he was familiar with the well-established rule
that a junior lienholder cannot cut off a prior lien by the
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device of bidding in the encumbered property at a tax
sale. He knew that in such cases "equity will relieve against
such oppression and teach the grasping creditor moderation in his demands and that he cannot destroy others to
build up his own fortunes." See Fair v. B1·own, 40 Iowa
209; Quinby v. Meyer, 148 So. 869; Riley v. Bank, 23 P (2)
362; Baird v. Fischer, 220 N. W. 892; Des Moines Bank v.
Eisenmenger, 235 N. W. 390; Norton v. Myers, 77 N. W.
298; Chrisman v. Hough, 47 S. W. 941; McCready v. Fredericksen, 41 Utah 388, 126 P. 316. He therefore undertakes
to bring the suit to quiet title in the name of the plaintiff
in order to eliminate the appellants and after thus purifying the title, take over the property from the plaintiff.

·-

r
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It is not possible to reconcile the purchase of this tax
title by the plaintiff upon any reasonable theory of a goodfaith bidder. He bought the property at the urgent solicitation of Farnworth and Skeen after the former had told
him that she was,about to lose her interest in the property.
He bought it for the avowed purpose of protecting their
interests against the danger of loss which was threatened
by the judgment against her and the exchange agreement
which she made with the J ens ens. He agreed with them that
after acquiring the tax title he would clear off the outstanding interests and reconvey the property to Mrs. Farnworth's
attorney for her and his benefit. Mrs. Farnworth's attorney
went with the plaintiff to bid in the property. He examined
the tax proceedings leading up to the sale and he advised the
plaintiff to make the purchase. Skeen prepared the complaint in this action. He did so without charge to the plain~
tiff. The cost of the litigation was to be borne by Mrs. Farn-
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worth and Skeen. Skeen made himself a party to the action
along with Mrs. Farnworth for the obvious purpose of
making it appear that the plaintiff was the real owner of
the property and claiming it adversely to them. Of course,
they made default as everyone fully understood they would
do. So far as the action to quiet title against Farnworth
and Skeen was concerned it was a fictitious. and collusive
proceeding. It was a mere form to give the appearance of
solemnity to what in reality was a sham. It was just a step
in the scheme to deprive the appellants of their rights. The
authorities condemn such a scheme and strike down the apparent title thus acquired. In Turner v. Edwards, supra,
the plaintiff purchased property at a tax sale. Her mother
was the life tenant, the remainder-over being vested in the
children of the decedent by a former marriage. The life
tenant failed to pay the taxes and the plaintiff purchased
the property with her own money. Plaintiff brought suit
to quiet her title and the remaindermen claimed that there
was collusion between the plaintiff and her mother, the life
tenant, to have the plaintiff bid in the property. There was
evidence that soon after the period for redemption had expired the life tenant attempted to sell the property. This
fact, together with the fact that the plaintiff was the
daughter of the life tenant, was sufficient to show that the
purchase of the property by the plaintiff was the result of
a collusive arrangement. The court said:
"Collusion is a secret agreement and co-operation for a fraudulent or deceitful purpose. Webster's
New International Dictionary (2d) 1935. It implies
a secret understanding whereby one party plays into
another's hands for fraudulent purposes. W. E. Bow-
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en Improvement Co. v. Van Hafften, 209 Mo. App.
629, 238 S. W. 147; Brainerd Dispatch Newspaper
Co. v. County of Crow Wing, 196 Minn. 194, 264 N.
W. 779, 780; Lindstrom v. National Life Ins. Co. of
United States, 84 Or. 588, 165 P. 675, 677. In its
legal significance it involves an agreement between
two or more persons to defraud another of his rights
by forms of law or to obtain an object forbidden by
law. Burt v. Clague, 183 Minn. 109, 235 N. W. 620.
It is a general rule that fraud renders voidable everything into which it enters. The court will look
through any form of instrument or proceedings, no
matter how solemn, in order to prevent a party from
profiting by his own fraud. It is immaterial that he
has conformed to all the formal requirements of the
law. 3 Dunnell, Minn. Dig., 2d Ed. & 1937 Supp.,
section 3834; Baart v. Martin, 99 Minn. 197, 108 N.
w. 945."
_
_

_

~~

~~

.~

·.~·

In Adams v. Snyfkr, supra, the plaintiff brought suit
to foreclose a mortgage executed by Rudolph Snyder, who
was a son-in-law of S. J. Eisberg, who later became the
owner of the property. S. J. Eisberg conveyed the property
to his brother, S. N. Eisberg, who in turn conveyed it to a
corporation of which S. J. Eisberg was president. Still
later the corporation conveyed to S. N. Eisberg and M. J.
Eisberg, brothers of S. J. Eisberg. The taxes were allowed
to become delinquent and the county brought suit to foreclose the tax lien and the property was sold to Strauss, ·
a brother-in-law of M. J. Eisberg. S. J. Eisberg was a
bidder at the sale. Strauss bid $441.67 in excess of the
taxes and costs. As soon as Strauss acquired title at the
tax sale M. J. and S. N. Eisberg conveyed the property
by quitclaim deed to him. Strauss bid in the property
with his own funds and there was no evidence that there

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

42

was any agreement between him and the Eisbergs that
Strauss would reconvey the property to them or that he
would protect their interests. Plaintiff claimed that there
was fraud and collusion between Strauss and the Eisbergs
to defeat her mortgage. The court found such collusion to
exist from the fact that the Eisbergs had prevailed upon
Strauss, who was their relative, to bid in the property, and
that Strauss knew that the Eisbergs were endeavoring to
free the property from the lien of the plaintiff's mortgage.
The court said :
"The facts and circumstances already set forth
strongly tend to show collusion clear down to the
purchas·e at the tax sale. It was. a family affair, and
all appear to have cooperated to the same end, that is,
to defeat the mortgage, but only Strauss had the
hardihood to defend against the charge and the inculpating facts and circumstances alleged and shown.
The different steps of action and inaction manifestly
point to the same purpose, the defeat of plaintiff's
mortgage, even to the care taken to have competition among thems.elves at the sale and thus giving
it the appearance of innocence and validity. It is said
that there is no direct evidence that defendants combined for the illegal purpose. Conspiracy to defraud
cannot always be shown by direct evidence. Those engaged in a conspiracy to defraud rarely admit the
common purpose, but in such cases circumstantial
evidence suffices. When there is collusion, each of
the parties charged evincing a knowledge and approval of the acts. of the others, all in furtherance of
the conspiracy, proof of the s.eparate acts of several
persons may be shown, and it has been said: 'The
greater the secrecy that is observed regarding the
object of s.uch concurrence, the stronger is the evidence of conspiracy.' 5 R. C. L. 1104."
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In Guldner v. Guldner, supra, the plaintiff brought
suit to set aside a tax deed issued to Jacob Guldner. She
had been married to Hugo Guldner, brother of Jacob, but
obtained a divorce from him. In the divorce decree the
plaintiff was awarded two-thirds interest in the property
with the right to use and occupy all of the property and receive all of the rents and income therefrom as long as she
lived. The other one-third was awarded to Hugo; that is,
he retained such one-third interest by the decree. A short
time before the decree was entered the property was sold
for delinquent taxeS. It was bid in by Peck who was an attorney connected with the firm of attorneys. representing
Jacob Guldner. The latter furnished Peck with the money to
bid in the property. Jacob took an assignment of the certificate of sale and shortly after the divorce was granted acquired the tax deed. It appeared that plaintiff and her husband had been having trouble before the divorce was
granted and Jacob knew of this trouble. Hugo had falsely
informed his wife at the time of the divorce that the taxes
had been paid, although there was no evidence that Jacob
knew of the false representation made by Hugo. There was
no evidence whatever that Hugo furnished Jacob the money
which the latter gave to Peck to bid in the property, and
there was no evidence of any agreement on the part of Jacob
to reconvey the property to Hugo. N otwiths.tanding the absence of such direct evidence the court found that there was
collusion between Hugo and Jacob to deprive the plaintiff
of her interest in the property. We quote from the opinion :
"Jacob Guldner was conversant with the family
relations between Hugo Guldner and his wife, and
their troubles. The association of these two brothers
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for some time prior to the divorce proceedings was
intimate. It seems that Jacob ran a restaurant, and
Hugo boarded with him most of the time. Jacob
Guldner never, at any time prior to the service of
his notice on the wife to dispossess her, advised her
about his owning the tax deed. He made no effort to
serve a notice on her of the taking of the tax deed,
and another peculiar circumstance is that his brother
moved out of said property about three days after
Jacob Guldner had served notice on him with reference to the deed.
"The tax certificate, when it was originally issued, was issued to G. H. Peck, who was an attorney
connected with the firm of attorneys representing
Jacob Guldner. It is shown by the evidence that
Peck at no time had an money with which to purchase
tax deeds, and we are quite satisfied from the record
that the deed was in fact purchased for and at the
instance of Jacob Guldner. We are further satisfied
from the record that there was a secret understanding between Jacob Guldner and his brother Hugo, and
that they combined to defeat this. woman of her
rights in the property.
"The whole record in this case abundantly satis·
fied us that the appellee was wholly ignorant of the
exact situation as it relates to this tax sale, and that
her husband lulled her into security. while the brother
Jacob carefully refrained and secreted from her the
knowledge of his relation to the property and his relation to this tax sale. The action of the appellant
Jacob Guldner seems to us not to have been in good
faith . . . .
"Of course, fraud in the procurement of the tax
deed will always be available as a basis for equitable
relief. Connolly v. Connolly, 63 Iowa, 202, 18 N. W.
868; Leas v. Garverich, 77 Iowa, 275, 42 N. W. 194.
It need not be actual fraud, but may be constt:uctive
fraud. First Congregational Church v. Terry, 130

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

45
Iowa, 513, 107 N. W. 305, 114 Am. St. Rep. 443;
Ellsworth v. Cordrey, 63 Iowa 675, 16 N. W. 211;
Dohms v. Mann, 76 Iowa 723, 39 N. W. 823; Lynn v.
Morse, 76 Iowa 665, 39 N. W. 203.
"Close family ties, intimate associations, or actual trust and confidence, are also matters that
should be considered in cases of this kind. Lampman
v. Lampman, 118 Iowa 140, 91 N. W. 1042; Bettendorf v. Bettendorf, 190 Iowa 83, 179 N. W. 444, 945.''
In the case of First Congregational Church v. T,erry~
107 N. W. 305, 114 A. St. Rep. 443, a testatrix had devised
a tract of land to her brother for life with remainder to the
plaintiff church. The life tenant allowed the taxes to become delinquent and the property was bought in at tax sale
by one Terry, a friend of the life tenant. Terry conveyed
the land to Park, who on the same day in turn conveyed it to
the wife of the life tenant and to her children. The remainderman brought suit to cancel the tax deeds. The tax deeds
were held to be merely a redemption of the taxes. The court
said:

It

" ...... Collusive and fraudulent agreements are not
often made in the presence of persons other than
those participating in the fraud. In the nature of
things they are difficult to prove by direct evidence,
and must be established in whole or in part by proof
of collateral circumstances. They are carried on under the cover of secrecy, and the participants are
rarely found to be frank and candid witnesses. And
while, generally speaking, fraud is not to be presumed, yet when all the circumstances combined present a showing that can be reconciled with no reasonable theory nf good faith, courts will not hesitate to
place the stamp of invalidity upon the transaction.
In the case before us a careful examination of the
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abstracts and of the transcript convinces us beyond
all doubt that the acquiring of the tax title was
brought abo:ut by a wrongful and collusive arrang~
ment between the life tenant, Edward J. Hale, his
wife, Elsie J. Hale, his .father in law, Park, and their
mutual friend and confident, Terry, with the express purpose and object of eliminating the interests
of the remaindermen.
"We shall not extend the opinion to state the
testimony at length. It is enough to say that soon
after coming into the life estate Hale began to seek
the help of a friend to procure a tax title to the land,
and circumstances demonstrate that Terry, an old
and intimate acquaintance, was complaisant enough
to serve his purpose. Hale left the tax of 1896, a matter of some twelve dollars, to become delinquent. At
the treasurer's sale Terry, who never before or since
purchased a piece of land for taxes, bought it in.
Within a few days after the deed was procured he
conveyed the property, worth one thousand to fifteen hundred dollars, to Park for the amount of his
investment in it, less than one hundred dollars, and
immediately and as a part of the same transaction
and pursuant to Terry's request Park conveyed it to
Hale's wife .and children. Terry said that he knew
the condition of the title and that from the outset he
intended to do just what he did do; that is, obtain
a tax title and transfer it to Hale's family. Whether
Park was a party to the arrangement originally, or
was called in later to serve as a conduit through
which to pass the title from the purchaser to the
Hales and thereby add to the difficulty of tracing the
fraud, is immaterial. He does not pretend to have
taken the title for any other purpose than to give the
benefit of it to his daughter and her family. While
Terry swears that he never mentioned to Hale the
matter of his purchase of the land for taxes, it must
be presumed that Hale knew perfectly well what was
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going on in this respect. Notice of the impending
conveyance by the treasurer was served upon him,
and, if he did not rest in the certainty that the certificate ·was in the hands of a friend on whom he
could rely, it is incredible that he would permit this
valuable property which furnished him home and
shelter for life to pass from his hands for the trifling
sum required to redeem it. Terry's story is broken,
halting, and incoherent, and in every line betrays
confusion not unusual in a witness who will not willingly tell an untruth, but finds perfect frankness
embarrasing. It is not at all improbable that Hale
harbored the feeling that his sist~r ought to have devised the land to him absolutely, nor was it entirely
unnatural that his personal friends should sympathize in that feeling and be easily persuaded that to
assist him in cutting out. the remaindermen and trans...
mitting his life estate into a fee in himself or in
members of his immediate family would be a meritorius act. But this sympathy, however amiable and
pardonable in itself, cannot be allowed to disguise
the legal wrong involved in evading the effect of the
testator's will and diverting the property from the
purposes to which she had dedicated it."
In none of the cases above cited do we have such clear
and convincing evidence of a scheme to eliminate outstanding prior interests in property by those having inferior interests as that found in the present case. Here we have unequivocal acts, omissions and admissions that point with
certainty to the collusive arrangement. In the cases cited,
such collusive arrangement was found to exist notwithstanding the absence of direct and positive proof.

,eJ.W

We respectfully submit that plaintiff acquired no title
under the tax sale proceedings, but if it should be held other-
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wise the purchase of the plaintiff constituted in law merely
a redemption.
Respectfully submitted,

W. Q. VAN COTT,
D. EUGENE LIVINGSTON,
GRANT H. BAGLEY,
E. LEROY SHIELDS.,
Attorneys for Appellants.
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